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Abstract: After the era of nihilism, ethical 
issues have been gradually focused on how to 
rebuild a value of “Being”. Thinkers tend to 
reaffirm the significance of one’s own Being and 
try to find a way of existence in order to resist 
against nothingness. In such an epoch, Levinas 
contends that the ethics “for the Other” and the 
existence are inextricably linked. Furthermore, 
he notes that the value of existence is not re-
vealed against the nihilism, but realized with 
the ethics “for the Other” in one’s act of assum-
ing the burden of existence. The meaning of 
“Being” is thus revealed in the effort of “for the 
Other” and in the noble will of making the 
sense of responsibility beyond ones’ own Being 
to reach the Other. 
 
 




Resumen: Después de la era del nihilismo, las 
cuestiones éticas se han ido enfocando gra-
dualmente en cómo reconstruir un valor de 
“Ser”. Los pensadores tienden a reafirmar la 
importancia del propio Ser e intentan encontrar 
una manera de existir capaz de resistir contra 
la nada. En dicha época, Levinas sostiene que 
la ética “por el Otro” y la existencia están inex-
tricablemente unidas. Más aún, dice que el 
valor de la existencia no se revela frente al 
nihilismo, sino que se realiza en la ética “por el 
Otro” en el acto mismo de asumir la carga de la 
existencia. El sentido de “ser” es así revelado 
en el esfuerzo “por el Otro” y en la voluntad 
noble de dar sentido a la responsabilidad más 
allá del propio Ser para alcanzar al Otro.   
 
 







After Being is considered an important issue in the history of philosophy, 
nihilism, under the dichotomy of Being and Nihilism, can be regarded as the 
inauguration of the predicament of Being. The ethical issues have, after the age 
of nihilism, been addressed to the problems of how to reconstruct the value of 
Being. How to help one re-affirm his/her meaning of Being thus becomes a goal 
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to which most thinkers of the age dedicates themselves. But we have to ask, 
whether the theoretical constitution on the Being and Nihilism can pay any af-
firmative regard to one’s existence? Whether the approach of enhancing the 
value of Being against nihilism leads one to any new possibility? How is the ex-
istence constituted? What is the schematization of existence evoked from the 
core of existence? In the paper, we would attempt to analyze the ethical mean-
ing from the essence of one’s existence in the light of Levinas’ early thought. 
First, I would quote one passage from the Preface of Levinas’s Existence 
and Existents (2001) in order to distinguish “a being” in general (l’étant en 
général) from Being in general (l’être en général). By so doing, we are allowed 
to illuminate the meaning of the concepts concerning Being in general in early 
Levinas’ thought, such as the existent (l’existant), existence (l’existence) and 
so forth.  
 
What is the event of Being, Being in general, detached from beings which dominate 
it? What does its generality mean? It is certainly something else than the generality 
of a genus. Already the “something” in general, the pure form of an object, which 
expresses the idea of “a being” in general, is above genuses, since one does not 
descend from it toward species by adding specific differences. The idea of “a being” 
in general already deserves the name transcendent, which the medieval Aristoteli-
ans applied to the One, Being and the Good. But the generality of Being — of what 
makes up the existence of an existent — is not equivalent to that transcendence. 
Being cannot be specified, and does not specify anything. It is not a quality which 
an object supports, nor what supports qualities. Nor is it the act of a subject, even 
though in the expression “this is” Being becomes an attribute — for we are immedi-
ately obliged to state that this attribute adds nothing to the subject. Are we not, 
then, obliged to see in the very difficulty we have of understanding the category 
according to which Being belongs to a being the mark of the impersonal character 
of Being in general? Does not Being in general become the Being of “a being” by an 
inversion, by that event which is the present (and which shall be the principal 
theme of this book)? But if of itself Being refuses the personal form, how then are 
we to approach it? 
This work will be structured as follows: it sets out to approach the idea of Being in 
general in its impersonality so as to then be able to analyze the notion of the pre-
sent and of position, in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises in impersonal 
Being, though a hypostasis. But these issues did not just arise by themselves. They 
seem to us to ensue from certain positions of contemporary ontology which have 
made possible the renewal of the philosophical problematic (Levinas, 2001, 2-3). 
 
FOR THE OTHER: THE ETHICAL MEANING EVOKED FROM THE CORE OF EXISTENCE 119 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 119 
 
“A being” in general, as an absolute form of object or as an idea and su-
preme form, goes beyond beings and, in a form of “something” (quelque 
chose), emerges. This mode of beings can be regarded as the Greek significa-
tion of Ousia to embark on the discussion that follows. As for the generality of 
Being, of what makes up the existence of an existent is not tantamount to the 
transcendental “a being” in general, but the impersonal Being in general. 
Levinas attempts to divide the two concepts in order to illuminate the existence 
as a fact—such as hypostasis, being, subject, or existent—that emerges in a 
manner of impersonal Being in general. Alongside Levinas’s outline of thought, 
the paper begins with the discussion of the word Ousia to elucidate his concept 
of Being in general. Then, I would further examine what the impersonal Being, 
or Being in general is, and exhibit the existing fact in attempt to expound its 
ethical signification.  
 
 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS- 
FROM “A BEING” IN GENERAL TO BEING IN GENERAL 
 
1.1. The relation between nothingness and existence from “A Being” in 
general 
 
1.1.1 The mode of existence appeared in indolence 
 
The Greek word Ousia as truth, essence, and Being can be used to suggest 
the possession (avoir) of a property, in which the connection of Being and 
property entails the immanent relation between Being and something (quelque 
chose). It suggests that the meaning of Being appears in the image of a valua-
ble thing that can be possessed, or the so-called “a being” in general. The 
meaning of a subject can be explained through the sovereignty of possessor1.  
 
 
1 There is a famous fairy tale that aptly accounts for the subjectivity in the traditional philosophy as well 
as the relation between subject and object. There was once upon a time, a king with his golden finger 
was so happy to transform everything as golden object in the realm of his kingdom. Each object, once 
touched by his fingers, was transformed into his property. This made the king so happy and he avidly 
shared this pleasure with his beloved daughter. However, at the moment when the daughter was 
touched by the king, she became the property of the king’s possession. After this occurs, there will not 
be any other life, or any other person appearing in king’s life. The tale delineates the image of subject in 
the traditional philosophy, evoking images of solitude, isolation, fixation, opposition, and so on. These 
images mentioned above reveal the subject as the pale reason. The underlying relation between subjec-
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After Parmenides’ thought, the opposition between Being and non-Being 
has excluded the nothingness from the horizon of Being. With the consistent 
principle of Being and thought, the non-Being cannot be thought so that the 
subject cannot explain the non-Being by the logic of “possession” of the sub-
ject. Thus, nothingness in this regard is far from the nothing itself, but the 
“nothing” under the rationale of Being -- nothingness. The nihilism comes along 
with the thought’s annotation of nothingness. In the experience of existence, 
we do not lack the understanding of “nothing”, no matter whether it is the 
“nothing” of absence compared with the relation of the “having” of presence, or 
whether it is the inability of the subject’s confrontation with the world after the 
destruction of the sovereignty. All these appear that people consider nothing-
ness as the negation of Being. The subject of thinking constructs the epistemo-
logical system of nothingness by the concepts within the category of Being. Ob-
viously the subject includes, it shows, the nothingness into the horizon of Be-
ing.  
In his Time and the Other, after Levinas translates the Being (l’être) and 
being (l’étant) as the existing (l’exister) and the existent (l’existant) (Levinas, 
1987, 24). He further advocates that: 
 
Existing is always grasped in the existent, and for the existent that is a human be-
ing the Heideggerian term Jemeimigkeit precisely expresses the fact that existing is 
always possessed by someone. I do not think Heidegger can admit an existing (un 
exister) without existents (sans existant), which to him would seem absurd. 
(Levinas, 1987, 24) 
 
Being and being, translated by Levinas from the perspective of existing and 
the existent, are not the transcendental being of “a being” in general, but the 
human being as a fact of human existence. The problem of Being and being to 
which Levinas devotes himself does not, however, concern the transcendental 




tivity and the absolute sovereignty comes to the fore, if we rethink the tale in a philosophical perspec-
tive. Moreover, the tale suggests the subject excludes the Other with alterity. The ontology of identity 
based on one centre reveals the interior characteristics of the traditional philosophy 
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Based on the existence, nothingness, in the concept of “a being” in general, 
is not the nothing that departs from the Being of Parmenides’ tradition, but the 
result from which the human beings negate themselves as the nihilists do.  
People have to face the fact that we on the hand rely on Being, yet we ne-
gate it on the other hand. This fact not only leads to nihilism but also suggests 
the fatigue, an unalienable fact of Being which people have to face. This is the 
passive mode of Being, or, after Levinas’s thought, indolence2.  In his Existing 
and Existence, Levinas provides us an example concerning the relationship be-
tween my existing (exister) and “I”: “Little John the simpleton, simple or inno-
cent, in the Russian folktale tossed the lunch, which he was to carry to his fa-
ther at work in the field, to his shadow, so as to slip away from it; but after he 
had dropped everything his shadow, like a last and unalienable possession, still 
clung to him” (Levinas, 2001, 38). 
The relation between “I” and “my existing”, as the example exhibits, re-
sembles the fact that Little John can never escape his shadow. The “existing” 
appears to be the inescapable responsibility. Indolence expressly proffers the 
evidence of the “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) of my existing and its irreplaceabil-
ity. The fact qua “existing” suggests that indolence does not imply to give up 
the existence, but the tiredness of living. Indolence emerges with the impossi-
bility of escaping from existence, and the impossibility invokes the absolute 
desire of escape. Indolence, thus, suggests not merely the passivity against 
existence, but its inactivity that sharpens the inescapable responsibility be-
tween “I” and “my existing”. 
 The mode of “existing” in indolence exhibits the destiny of human being’s 
Being: “my existing” is the fact without any choice. Hence, nothingness is not 
the fact that that determines the predicament of one’s being, but the fact that 





2 “Indolence is an impotent and joyless aversion to the burden of existence itself. It is a being afraid to 
live which is nevertheless a life, in which the fear of the unaccustomed, adventure, the unknown is a 
repugnance devolving from the aversion for the enterprise of existence. Such is Oblomov's, a radical and 
tragic indolence before existing told in the famous work of the Russian novelist. From the first page of 
the novel Goncharov presents his hero supine, and this existential decubitus will be the dominant image 
of the tale”. (Levinas, 2001, 17). Indolence (as the withdrawal of the act of facing that suggests the 
dubiety of facing the existence or the indolent existence) as a more fundamental mode of perception is 
already internalized in one’s responsibility toward one’s life. 
122 WAN-I YANG 
 
 122 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
1.1.2 The anxiety (Angst): the influence of Heidegger’s nothingness to-
ward the Being 
 
The concept of nothingness derived from “a being” in general becomes 
Heidegger’s concept of anxiety (Angst). The anxiety suggests that death is no 
longer a point unknown in the future; it already functions in the present mo-
ment of existence. Thus, the Heideggerian death does not suggest the fact of 
destructing existence, but the negativity within the existence. This death ap-
pears like the nothingness in the existence, which is “opposite” to the exist-
ence. The death fails to efface the existence, and it, no doubt, disturbs and 
awakens the existents in order to get itself free (dégagent) from the quotidian 
life. Heidegger does not intend to comprehend the existence from the quotidian 
dimension, but affirms the meaning of Being by anxiety. But again, we have to 
ask, doesn’t one’s existence imply the existing fact in our quotidian life?3   
The meaning of Being in Heidegger’s philosophy has been ambivalently 
shrouded with the shadows of death, which already exhibits an atmosphere of 
negation to life. Facing the negativity of death underlying the existence, 
Levinas employs Epicurus’s words4 to distinguish the difference between the 
death in the philosophical sense and the death in the sense of destructive ex-
istence. The relation between “my death” and “I” remains permanently un-
known and incomprehensible: the death conceived by the “I” at this moment is 
no longer the reality of “my death”, but the mere imagination of “I” toward the 
death of myself. Based on the non-coexistent relation between my death and 
“I”, Levinas excludes death from existence, and employs the reality of existence 
at this moment to explain the meaning of Being. The fact of existence is consti-
tuted by the events of existent’s encounter. The events are not pre-designed 
for a definite end, but the contingency, which can never be pre-designed or 
predicted. That is, one can never predict the arrival of death. The reality of ex-
istence tends to accept the fact of unexpectedness of death as well as the fact 
that death can take one’s life at its will or at any moment.  
 
 
3 For Levinas, the human existence is the everyday life, the fact as existence: “Nowhere in the phenom-
enal order does the object of an action refer to the concern for existing; it itself makes up our existence. 
We breathe for the sake of breathing, eat and drink for the sake of eating and drinking, we take shelter 
for the sake of taking shelter, we study to satisfy our curiosity, we take a walk for the walk. All that is 
not for the sake of living; it is living. Life is a sincerity” (Levinas, 2001, 36, 67). 
4 “If you are there, then death is not there; if it is there, you are not there” (Levinas, 2000, 19). 
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1.1.3 To recapitulate 
 
From his example of indolence and his critique on Heidegger, Levinas dis-
covers that the nothingness or death in the field of existence is neither nothing 
itself nor the death itself, but merely one’s imagination about nothing and 
death. The nothingness and imagination about death conceived as “a being” in 
general disturbs the existence with their negativity. In indolence and anxiety, 
we can see how the one is able to live in the nothingness and more important-
ly, how it is influenced to construct the meaning of Being on this imagination. 
One’s meaning of Being, according to Levinas, does not rely on the nothingness 
and the death in the context of “a being” in general. Levinas contends that the 
hypostasis, being, subject, and existent—all are exhibited in the impersonal 
Being in general, but, we may ask, what is Being in general? What is its rela-
tionship with the existent? This is, no doubt, a question to be discussed in the 
sections that follow. 
  
 
1.2. Being in general, te il y a (there is)5 
 
Being, derived from the concept of Ousia (both be and have), is the mutual 
relationship between “a being” in general and the inner relationship within the 
sovereignty, suggesting a certain object to be possessed under the light. In this 
sense, the night is excluded from Being. Thus, the concept of il y a (there is), 
as Levinas argues, challenges not only the relation between light and Being in 
Parmenides’ thought, but also the concept of “possession” (avoir) in the sover-
eignty of the being in general (l’étant en général). Although the night as ab-
sence is not the visual object, but, in a manner of objective universalism6, it 
approaches the subject. Everything disappears at night—the night that devours 
everything emerges as a gigantic apparition. It can hardly be controlled by visi-
bility, yet it surrounds where we are. The night, like air, surrounds the world, 
yet in a form of presence of universal absence. This is like Being in general 
 
 
5 The relation between the subject and the beings is that of possession; that is, “I” possesses “some-
thing”. Levinas uses the il y a (there is) to conceptualize the general presence such as the air and the 
night. 
6 Object is relative to the subject. In the precondition of subject-object relation, the general form of the 
object can be regarded as “the being relative to the subject”. 
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(l’être en général), who emerges everywhere7. The il y a (there is) announces 
the fact that the meaning of Being is no longer limited in the scope of light and 
visibility, but everywhere that cannot be controlled by the subject.  
Subject’s affectivity to the night replaces the traditional subject-object rela-
tionship based on the visibility. The night is neither the vacuum of the nothing 
nor the nothingness, but the inescapable compulsion in the affectivity. Levinas 
affirms the night as a mode of Being in the existence8.  For him, the night and 
the day are the field of subject’s existence, and the meaning of Being con-
structed by the theme of existence does not, however, concern the field of 
nothingness. 
 The existence is, as Levinas unravels, an inescapable presence, and it is a 
reality that cannot be escaped by negation. It is the il y a (there is) that we 
cannot have any alternative nor can we escape. The relationship with the il y a 
as if the “I” that dwells in the night or air, the incapable perceptivity surround-
ed by the dark night, and the “I” that needs the air to survive—these suggest 
that the “I” is no longer the owner of the sovereignty, but an existent appearing 
in the impersonal Being9.  The meaning of Being evoked by the existence is not 
exhibited in the image of Ousia, but in the human existence. But, I would ask, 





7 “When the forms of things are dissolved in the night, darkness of the night, which is neither an object 
nor the quality of an object, invades like a presence. In the night, where we are driven to it, we are not 
dealing with anything. But this nothing is not that of pure nothingness. There is no longer this or that; 
there is not ‘something.’ But this universal absence is in its turn presence, an absolutely unavoidable 
presence”. (Levinas, 2001, 52) 
8 There is no void in Levinas’s philosophy. Instead, he employs the il y a (there is) a to fill in the gap of 
the void in the traditional philosophy. The il y a (there is), as Levinas describes as “the existing without 
existent”, is not revealed in the schematization of thought, but merely experienced in the existence. He 
employ the insomnia as an example experienced between the existent and the il y a (there is). 
In the traditional philosophy, light is the image of thought. This image in the life does, however, not 
reflect the eternality, but the turns of nights and days, like the ephemeral flashes of the fireworks, if we 
employ the image of thought in the daily life context. The light of thought as a metaphor expresses the 
enlightenment from the innocence and obscuration; the thought as a metaphor of the turns of nights 
and days presents a regional thought that traces back the dwelling of the origin. The clarity of thought to 
the beings is akin to the light and existent. However, the thought of the existent is not a permanent 
conscious: the inner relation between body and conscious will reveal and the conscious must return to 
its sleep for a rest, once the fatigue weakens the dominant power of the conscious. Sleep is a home-
coming experience of the conscious; the conscious that returns to the body is its return to the dwelling 
of the origin. What the insomniac experience is the inability of an existent inundated by the existing—
which is like the hostage captured by the Being itself—after the conscious becomes loose and slack. The 
insomniac prostrates on the bed, and looses the control of Being. Facing the imminent profoundness of 
the dark night, the insomniac can hardly fall into sleep, escape… 
9 This is the concept of “position” in footnote 2: “It sets out to approach the idea of Being in general in 
its impersonality so as to then be able to analyze the notion of the present and of position, in which a 
being, a subject, an existent, arises in impersonal Being, though a hypostasis”. 
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II. THE EXISTING SCHEMATIZATION CONSTRUCTED FROM THE CORE OF EXISTENCE 
 
The existing feature of the existent is, as Levinas indicates in his Time and 
the Other (Levinas, 1987), the closure of the monad, which describes the exist-
ent’s solitude of “unexchangeability of existence”. In this book, Levinas pre-
sents an existing schematization of the existence as a core from the analysis of 
solitude, but we may continue to ask, what is the meaning of solitude in 
Levinas’s thought? Can the solitude from the lack of the Other (Autrui)10 not 
suffice its meaning of essence? How would Levinas exhibit the existence 
through the interpretation of solitude? 
  
2.1. The relationship between the solitude and other 
 
The association of the solitude with Robinson Crusoe suggests a general 
conception on the sense of solitude; most critiques conceptualize the relation of 
“being-with-others” as a counter argument for Robinson’s solitude, being de-
serted and isolated. We cannot know whether Heidegger’s relationship of “be-
ing-with- others” between Dasein and the other addresses the above solitude, 
which is the impact of the general conceptualization. However, surely, “being-
with-others” is Heidegger’s a priori structure that interprets the relation be-
tween Dasein and the other. 
Being-with is the essential rule of Dasein; the meaning of being-with sug-
gests not merely others’ accompanying of “being-with”. Also, it suggests that 
Dasein comes along with the ontological structural a priori, even without the 
presence of others. Thus, the ontological structural a priori does not need to 
have an isolated subject first and then, the relationship with others is consoli-
dated. Instead, only in the sociality can the meaning of Dasein be disclosed. A 
passage from Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) accounts for the rela-
tion between Dasien and others:  
 
But, according to the analysis which we have now completed, being-with-others be-
longs to the being of Da-sein, with which it is concerned in its very being. As being-
with, Da-sein “is” essentially for the sake of others. This must be understood as an 
 
 
10 I would henceforth translate Levinas’s l’autrui as “the Other” in English. 
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existential statement as to its essence. But when actual, factical Da-sein does not 
turn to others and thinks that it does not need them, or misses them, it is in the 
mode of being-with. In being-with as the existential for-the-sake-of-others, these 
others are already disclosed in the Da-sein. (Heidegger, 1962, 115-116) 
 
Being-with discloses the inner connection between Dasein and the others; 
Dasein becomes what it is according to the truth of “for-the-sake-of-others”. 
The existing structure of Dasein is inseparable from the others due to the fact 
that the meaning of Dasein is just defined within the relation with others. The 
meaning of the self in the world and that of the others are never two separated 
themes. Heidegger thus suggests: 
 
One belongs to the others oneself, and entrenches their power. “The others”, whom 
one designates as such in order to cover over one’s own essential belonging to 
them, are those who are there initially and for the most part in everyday being-
with-one-another. The who is not this one and not that one, not oneself and not 
some and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the they. (Heidegger, 
1962, 118-119) 
 
The they (or the on in French, and das Man in German) concealed in others 
is inauthentic; it is the “other” without face 11. If Dasein becomes what it is with 
the truth of “for-the-sake-of-others”, then Dasein of “for-the-sake-of-others” is 
not, however, for any others. The meaning of “for-the-sake-of-others” does not 
designate the human communication among the people. Instead, it is the social 
life that coherently underlies a relation of “one-with-the-other” (l’un-avec-
l’autre). This relation ignores the privacy of the existence as well as the fact 
that the meaning of Being cannot and will not be exhausted with the relation of 
being-with. The Dasein of “for-the-sake-of -others”, in its very essence, always 
fails to regard the face of the other; instead, it is a heart closed, a loner “with-
out” heart in people’s communication.  
The schematization of Dasein, for Levinas, portrays the meaning of solitude 
in Heidegger’s thought. However, Levinas, who regards solitude as the core of 
existence, is never satisfied with Heidegger’s ontological conceptualization. In 
his Time and the other (Le temps et l'autre), Levinas contends that: “Thus from 
 
 
11 According to Levinas, face is the sign of the Other (Autrui), from which the frame of bones are com-
posed to reveal the singularity of the Other. The characteristics of the Other are synthesized by differ-
ence and singularity, and it can never be thrown into the identity of the subject. 
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the start I repudiate the Heideggerian conception that views solitude in the 
midst of a prior relationship with the other. Though anthropologically incontest-
able, the conception seems to me ontologically obscure” (Levinas, 1987, 18). 
The Heideggerian solitude suggests the lack of human interaction, and this 
sort of solitude without the humans has already preexisted in Heidegger’s 
Dasein. In Heidegger’s context, the other Dasein is not the Other (Autrui) which 
is marked as alterity, but the other exteriority of myself (l’autre extérieur à 
moi). The other, after abstracted from the alterity, is only a formalized pres-
ence without face. Once Heidegger erased the face of the other Dasein (l’autre 
Dasein), the Dasein destiny of the essence of being-with of “for others” has 
been, at the moment, portrayed by the solitude without the human interaction. 
Heidegger, it seems to suggest, discloses the reality of social life. But we have 
to interrogate: whether the meaning of existence based on “being-with-the-
other” touches the profoundness of Being. Levinas is not satisfied with the 
meaning of existence disclosed by the solitude; further, he comments on the 
meaning of solitude in the domain of existence, except for the structure of be-
ing-with proposed by Heidegger12.    
 
2.2. The relation between solitude and existence 
 
Solitude cannot be interpreted as the “lack of the relation with the other”; 
its meaning comes from the “irreplaceability of the existence”: “All these rela-
tionships are transitive: I touch an object, I see the other. But I am not the 
other. I am all alone. It constitutes the absolutely intransitive element, some-
thing without intentionality or relationship” (Levinas, 1987, 42) 
Levinas delves into the meaning of solitude based on the contention of “the 
inexchangibility of existence”. When the existent is born from Being in general 
(or the il y a), the individuals who are given by the lights (or the conscious-
ness) with the form has taken the destiny of solitude. Solitude is already im-
manent in the existence: I cannot be you, you cannot be I, and I can only be 
myself, without any other alternatives. The fact of my Being as existence intim-
 
 
12 “The preposition mit (with) here describes the relationship. It is thus an association of side by side, 
around something, around a common term and, more precisely, for Heidegger, around the truth. It is 
not the face-to-face relationship, where each contributes everything, except the private fact of one’s 
existence. I hope to show, for my part, that it is not the preposition mit that should describe the original 
relationship with the other” (Levinas, 1987, 19). 
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idates me; I have to take the burden alone, or I cannot but take it all alone. 
Like in the pain of illness, the acuity of the illness exhibited from the existence 
can merely be inscribed upon the existence of one’s self, even though one is 
surrounded by the others and others’ greetings. It cannot be transmitted; it 
cannot be exchanged, and cannot even be comprehended. The being-with oth-
ers appears in the pain of existence, which is so unbearable. It seems to sug-
gest that the “I” in this world is environed by the people of the world beyond, 
and that the distance between us is an incommensurable gap. The sort of soli-
tude also emerges with the expectation of taking the burden for those in pain 
and disease. For example, parents would bear the child’s pain by their body 
rather than the child suffers themselves. However, the undeniable fact of 
“inexchangeability of existence”, like a sharp sword, separates the distance be-
tween parents and children. The children are born from Mother’s body, but the 
existence has presupposed the permanent separation between parents and 
children. The fact that one would use his/her body to suffer children’s pain on 
their behalf suggests one’s immanent solitude in existence13.   
 The inexchangeability of existence reveals the impossibility of being uni-
fied with the Other (l’autrui). I can imitate or imagine other’s feelings, but the 
unbridgeable gap between my imagination and the other’s perception reveals 
the devotion of rapture rather than sharing. The monadology of existence ne-
gates the experience of the union with the Other (l’autrui)14.    
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE ETHICAL MEANING EVOKED FROM THE CORE OF EXISTENCE 
 
Solitude is the unique irreplaceable oneness that links the existent to the 
existence; solitude embodies the relation between the existent and the exist-
 
 
13  Levinas employs the closure of the monad to depict the solitude of the existent, which is the 
“inexchageability of existence”:  
“One can exchange everything between beings except existing. In this sense, to be is to be isolated by 
existing. Inasmuch as I am, I am a monad. It is by existing that I am without windows and doors, and 
not by some content in me that would be incommunicable. If it is incommunicable, it is because it is 
rooted in my being, which is what is most private in me. In this way every enlargement of my 
knowledge or of my means of self-expression remains without effect on my relationship with existing, 
the interior relationship par excellence” (Levinas, 1987, 42). 
14 We can unite the other, such as the relation between the existent and the food. When the existent 
eats the food, food becomes the one within the existent. But the union of the existent with the other 
possibly comes from the existent’s digestion of food. Food as the favorite other of the existent is de-
stroyed (the act of eating by the existent) becomes one part of the existent. This to some extent ex-
plains the relation between the existent and other beings, but never can it be explained in the context 
between the humans. 
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ence. The profoundness of the meaning of solitude shouldn’t be interpreted by 
the relation with the other, but the existent’s inquiry to the essence of its exist-
ence.  
 
Solitude lies in the very fact that there are existents. To conceive a situation where-
in solitude is overcome is to test the very principle of the tie between the existent 
and its existing. It is to move toward an ontological event wherein the existent con-
tracts existence. (Levinas, 1987, 43) 
 
Solitude discloses that the existent is the only bearer for his/her responsi-
bility of existing. Probably I can die “for” the Other, but I can’t die “on behalf 
of” the Other. Thus, the highest value that the relation with the Other achieves 
is only “for” the Other, instead of “on behalf of” the Other. The 
inexchangeability of existence suggests two dimensions of meaning of solitude: 
(1) one’s inescapability that he/she has to bear for the existence of his/her own 
and (2) the impossibility of being the Other. The former presents the ontologi-
cal system in terms of the existent as the subject15, while the latter unravels 
Levinas’s ethics “for the Other” (pour autrui). Due to the fact that I cannot die 
“on behalf of” the Other, the responsibility to the Other suggests the ultimate 
proximity of the Other’s sufferance16.  The responsibility “for” the Other comes 
from the fact that one cannot die “on behalf of” the Other, or as the guilt of 
survivor’s.  
This is the most touching scene that attracts all the attention and admira-
tion from Levinas’s ethics. The most attractive part in Levinas’s philosophy is 
nothing other than “the infinite desire” that exhibits transcendence as well as 
the ethical issues constructed by the relation with the other. The relation be-
tween transcendence and ethics is the very issue that is constantly thought to-
gether. Levinas suggests that “Now ethics, when proposed as a modality of 
 
 
15 The solitude that evokes the ontology is what Levinas contends “certain positions of contemporary 
ontology which have made possible the renewal of the philosophical problematic”, as I noted earlier in 
footnote 2 (Levinas, 2001, 2-3). 
16  Sympathy and compassion, to suffer for the other or to "die a thousand deaths" for the other 
[I'autre], have as their condition of possibility a more radical substitution for an other [autrui]. This 
would be a responsibility for another in bearing his misfortune or his end as if one were guilty of causing 
it. This is the ultimate nearness. To survive as a guilty one. In this sense, the sacrifice for another 
[autrui] would create an other relation with the death of the other: a responsibility that would perhaps 
answer the question of why we can die. In the guiltiness of the survivor, the death of the other [l'autre] 
is my affair. My death is my part in the death of the other, and in my death I die the death that is my 
fault. The death of the other is not only a moment of the mineness of my ontological function. (Levinas, 
200, 39) 
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transcendence, can be thought on the basis of the secularization of the sacred” 
(Levinas, 2000, 163). Then, how would he regard the transcendence disclosed 
from the ethics? 
 
Transcendence signifies a movement of traversing (trans) and a movement of as-
cending (scando). In this sense, it signifies a double effort of stepping across an in-
terval by elevation or a change of level. Before any metaphor, the word is therefore 
to be thought in its sense of a change of site. In an age in which movement toward 
the heights is limited by the line of the summits, the heavenly bodies—stars fixed in 
their positions or traveling along closed trajectories—are intangible. The sky calls 
for a gaze other than that of a vision that is already an aiming and proceeds from 
need and to the pursuit of things. It calls for eyes purified of covetousness, a gaze 
other than that of the hunter with all his ruse, awaiting the capture. Thus the eyes 
turned toward the sky separate themselves in some fashion from the body in which 
they are implanted. And in this separation the complicity of the eye and the hand, 
which is older than the distinction between knowing and doing, is undone. Raising 
itself toward the sky, the gaze thus encounters the untouchable: the sacred. (The 
untouchable is the name of an impossibility before being that of a taboo.) The dis-
tance thus traversed by the gaze is transcendence. The gaze is not a climbing but a 
deference. In this way, it is wonder and worship. There is an astonishment before 
the extraordinary rupture that is height or elevation within a space closed to 
movement. Height thus takes on the dignity of the superior and becomes divine. 
From this spatial transcendence, crossed by vision, idolatry is born. (Levinas, 2000, 
163-64)  
 
The gaze, turning to the sky, excludes the bodily movement of the obses-
sive object, the existence. The pure gaze dissociates itself from the burden of 
body, and then destructs the most primitive complicity between the eye and 
the hand, which is prior to the division between knowing and doing. The gaze 
that turns to the sky is the pure gaze with the untouchable sacred, and the 
very non-crossable relationship is transcendence. For Levinas, the idolatry wor-
ship was thus born in the spatial transcendence, which is visually crossed. The 
idolatry symbolizes the secularization of the sacred. Levinas is thus not, as 
Jacques Rolland contends, a thinker of the sacred, but the opposite of the 
thought (Levinas, 2000, 190). Hence, if Levinas contends that the ethics can be 
extracted from the transcendent mode, or be conceptualized from the seculari-
zation of the sacred, it does not merely suggest that Levinas does not affirm 
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“the spatial transcendence visually crossed”, but reveals that he disagrees with 
the ethics which is disclosed by this transcendence.  
Levinas’s ethics is not the ethics to the untouchable and divine worship, but 
the agitation and the restlessness toward the death of the other, as he exhibits 
in God, Death, and Time. Most researches on ethics have been dedicated to 
transcendence, to the relation between the pure gaze and the untouchable sa-
cred (the being in general), but they, I want to argue, fail to address the au-
thentic meaning of the ethics. Once Levinas’s philosophy is read as the subject 
dissociating from itself to the infinite transcendence, the relationship with the 
other, in the transcendent context, can be regarded as an ethics independent 
itself from the existence. This would distinguish the relationship between ethics 
and the fact as existence from that between “for the Other” and “self-
preservation”. The fact as existence revealed by the “solitude” of the “irre-
placeability of existence”, as Levinas advocates in Time and the other, presents 
the inseparable relation between ethics and existence.  
The existent inscribed by the “irreplaceability of existence” demonstrates 
the relation with the Other. For the existent, the existence is the burden hardly 
to be warded off. The existent, in face of the pain of the Other, cannot, howev-
er, bear the pain on behalf of the Other, but merely bear the pain for the Oth-
er—this is the guilt off which the existent can hardly ward. For Levinas, the Be-
ing of the humans or the existence is not only schematized by the solitude, 
from which the ethics, too, resides. Each individual can only bear the fact of his 
own existence, despite his profound affectivity for the Other. One can discern 
the existent’s will of the meaning of responsibility to transcend the scope of his 
own Being and noble will of arriving at the  Other’s field through taking the re-
sponsibility of “for the Other”. The subject born from one’s responsibility for the 
Other does not suggest a subject who acts or does for the humans, but the one 
trapped in the predicament of the existence of himself with deep affectivity for 
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